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Abstract
Changes in people’s behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic can be regarded as the result
of two types of effects: the “intervention effect” (changes resulting from government orders or
requests for people to change their behavior) and the “information effect” (voluntary changes
in people’s behavior based on information about the pandemic). Using mobile location data to
construct a stay-at-home measure for different age groups, we examine how the intervention and
information effects differ across age groups. Our main findings are as follows. First, the age profile
of the intervention effect of the state of emergency declaration in April and May 2020 shows that
the degree to which people refrained from going out was smaller for older age groups, who are
at a higher risk of serious illness and death, than for younger age groups. Second, the age profile
of the information effect shows that, unlike the intervention effect, the degree to which people
stayed at home tended to increase with age for weekends and holidays. Thus, while Acemoglu et
al. (2020) proposed targeted lockdowns requiring stricter lockdown policies for the oldest group
in order to protect those at a high risk of serious illness and death, our findings suggest that
Japan’s government intervention had a very different effect in that it primarily reduced outings
by the young, and what led to the quarantining of older groups at higher risk instead was people’s
voluntary response to information about the pandemic. Third, the information effect has been
on a downward trend since the summer of 2020. While this trend applies to all age groups, it
is relatively more pronounced among the young, so that the age profile of the information effect
remains upward sloping, suggesting that people’s response to information about the pandemic is
commensurate with their risk of serious illness and death.
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1 Introduction
The number of COVID-19 infections in Japan began to increase in earnest in the latter half of February,
and by the end of March, the cumulative number of infections had reached 2,234. In response to the
spread of infections, the government declared a state of emergency on April 7 for seven prefectures
including Tokyo, and on April 16, the state of emergency was expanded to cover all prefectures. As a
result, people refrained from going out, and the number of new infections in Japan, after peaking at
720 on April 11, began to drop, falling to almost zero by the end of May. This was the first wave of
infections. However, in July, the number of new infections began to increase again, and continued to
increase throughout the summer (peaking at 1,605 new infections on August 7). This was the second
wave. While the second wave had subsided by the end of August, the number of new infections began
to increase once again in late October, and on December 31, 2020, the number of new infections in
Tokyo reached 1,353, exceeding 1,000 for the first time (the number of new infections nationwide
was 4,534). In response, the government again declared a state of emergency on January 7. We are
currently in the middle of the third wave.
The increase and decline in infections are closely linked to people’s behavior in terms of leaving
their homes. Previous research on changes in behavior has focused on two channels. The first channel is
called the “intervention effect,” which refers to changes in behavior as a result of government orders or
requests. In China, the United Sates, and European countries, governments have declared lockdowns
when infection rose, issuing “orders” for people to stay at home. In contrast, unlike the lockdowns in
these countries, restrictions during Japan’s state of emergency had no legal binding force, and there
were no fines, arrests, or other punishments imposed for leaving home during the state of emergency.
The Japanese government only verbally “requested” people to refrain from going out, and many people
heeded this “request” by staying at home. In this sense, Japan’s declaration of a state of emergency
can be regarded as a “voluntary lockdown.” The second channel is the “information effect,” which
refers to voluntary changes in people’s behavior based on information about the pandemic (such as the
number of new infections, number of deaths, etc.). There are various possible sources of information
that people can rely on. However, in developed countries including Japan, details on infections are
rarely disclosed to the public in order to protect the privacy of those infected. This means that
governments have considerably more information than is in the public domain (at least this is what
many people believe), so that information transmitted by the government is likely to have a greater
impact than in normal times.
In an earlier study (Watanabe and Yabu, 2020), we estimated the two effects using data for Japan
during the first wave and found that the government intervention of declaring a state of emergency
had the effect of reducing outings by 8.5% compared to before the coronavirus period. On the other
hand, estimating the two effects using data for the United States, Goolsbee and Syverson (2021) found
that the intervention effect associated with shelter-in-place (S-I-P) orders in the United States was
7.6%. What is interesting is that the size of the estimated intervention effects is of the same order of
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magnitude, despite the fact that the measures in Japan and the United States differed substantially
in terms of whether they were legally binding or not. However, while we interpreted our estimate
for Japan as showing that Japan’s voluntary lockdown had a reasonably large effect despite the fact
that the measures were not legally binding, Goolsbee and Syverson (2021) judged the effect of the
S-I-P orders in the United States to have been limited despite the fact that the measures were strictly
legally binding. Thus, even though the size of the effect was very similar, our assessment and theirs
were very different.
In this study, we elaborate on the analysis in Watanabe and Yabu (2020) by extending the obser-
vation period to include the second and third waves of the pandemic in Japan, creating stay-at-home
measures for different age groups, and estimating the intervention and information effects for each age
group. The main purpose of our analysis is to determine how the intervention and information effects
differ (or do not differ) by age. This matters because the serious illness rate and infection fatality
rate for those infected with COVID-19 vary greatly with age. According to figures published by the
Japanese government (MHLW, 2020), the serious illness rate is 150 times higher for people in their
70s than for those in their 20s, an extremely large difference. Large differences in the serious illness
and infection fatality rates by age group have also been reported for other countries, and substantial
differences in the way that COVID-19 affects different age groups is one of the most important char-
acteristics of the pandemic. Focusing on these differences, Acemoglu et al. (2020) argue that targeted
lockdowns for older age groups, rather than uniform lockdowns for all age groups, would be more
desirable in terms of effectively controlling infections while reducing the impact on economic activity.
Similar arguments have been made by medical researchers (e.g., Smith and Spiegelhalter, 2020). In
this study, we extend the methodology presented in Watanabe and Yabu (2020) and use it to estimate
the effect of interventions by age group. This allows us to examine whether the Japanese government’s
intervention policies, such as the declaration of a state of emergency and the closure of schools, meet
the criteria of optimal intervention policies highlighted by Acemoglu et al. (2020), i.e., policies that
maximize protection for those at greatest risk while minimizing the impact on economic activity. This
is the first objective of this study.
Our earlier study, Watanabe and Yabu (2020), showed that only one quarter of the reduction
in outings in Tokyo during the first wave can be explained by government interventions, while the
remaining three quarters were the result of people voluntarily changing their behavior as a result of
information about the pandemic. In this study, we examine the “information effect” in more detail.
Given that the information effect reflects information about COVID-19 infections and deaths, it to a
considerable extent reflects the impact of fear on people’s behavior, and numerous studies have focused
on this “fear effect.” For instance, Cochrane (2020) incorporates into the canonical epidemiological
model, the SIR model, an equation in which the transmission rate of the virus depends on the number
of new infections and deaths, based on the assumption that people decide whether to go out depending
on the number of new infections and deaths announced daily. Aum et al. (2020a) develop a setting
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in which fear of infection leads to disutility. Solving their optimization problem under this setting,
people choose not to go out or to work from home. The aspect of fear of COVID-19 has also featured
prominently in the field of psychology, where researchers have created a “Fear of COVID-19 Scale”
(Ahorsu et al., 2020)1 and, by investigating in experiments whether such indicators predict changes in
behavior (such as hand washing, social distancing, stockpiling food, working from home), have shown
that fear is the most important predictor of changes in behavior (Harper et al., 2020). In this study,
we follow this line of research and assume that the information effect to a considerable extent reflects
the “fear effect,” that is, the effect that people’s fear of infection increases as a result of exposure to
information about the pandemic (such as an increase in the number of newly infected people), which
in turn leads them to refrain from going out. An important implication of the fear effect defined in
this way is that it is age dependent. In other words, even if older and younger age groups are exposed
to the same information about infections, their level of fear will be different, and so will be the degree
to which they refrain from going out. The second aim of this study is to test this implication of the
information effect by estimating the information effect for each age group.
For our analysis, we use smartphone location data to construct a daily measure by prefecture,
gender, and age showing the degree to which people stayed at home. We then construct panel data,
which we use to distinguish between the intervention and information effects. For the intervention
effect, we use the variation in the stay-at-home measure across prefectures for identification. For
example, when the first state of emergency was declared on April 7, this covered only seven prefectures,
including Tokyo, but not the other prefectures. Therefore, comparing the stay-at-home measures for
prefecture A included the state of emergency and excluded prefecture B provides us with information
about the intervention effect of the emergency declaration. When doing so, it is important to compare
the same age group in both prefectures. For example, comparing the old in prefecture A with the
old in prefecture B means that there will be no difference in the information effect because we are
comparing people with the same risk of serious illness and death. This procedure therefore allows us
to extract the intervention effect only. Next, the fear effect can be extracted using the variation in
the stay-at-home measure across age groups. For example, if the number of new infections in Tokyo
increased significantly on a certain day, we compare how the stay-at-home measures for those in their
20s and 70s living in Tokyo responded to the increase. While these people live in the same area
(Tokyo in this case) and therefore have the same information about the pandemic (the number of new
infections in this example), their risk of serious illness and death differs, so that their level of fear will
also differ. Thus, by looking at the difference in the stay-at-home measure between those in their 20s
and those in their 70s, we can identify the fear effect.
The main findings of this study are as follows. First, the age profile of the intervention effect of
1Specifically, Ahorsu et al.’s (2020) “Fear of COVID-19 Scale” is based on responses on a five-item scale ranging
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” to seven statements such as “It makes me uncomfortable to think about
coronavirus-19,” “I am afraid of losing my life because of coronavirus-19,” and “When watching news and stories about
coronavirus-19 on social media, I become nervous or anxious,” which were then aggregated to create the fear scale.
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the emergency declarations issued in April and May 2020 shows that the degree to which older age
groups with a higher risk of serious illness and death refrained from outings was smaller than that
for younger age groups. This result indicates that the emergency declaration had the exact opposite
effect of the targeted lockdowns proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2020), which aim to quarantine the old
while allowing the young to carry on with economic activities, and may not have had the intended
impact in terms of effectively minimizing both the public health consequences and economic losses.
Second, the age profile of the information effect shows that, unlike the intervention effect, the degree
to which people stayed at home tended to increase with age for weekends and public holidays. This
result suggests that people update their information about the pandemic daily and make decisions
to refrain from outings based on their own risk of serious illness and death. In other words, what
achieved a “targeted lockdown” à la Acemoglu et al. (2020) was not government interventions such
as the declaration of a state of emergency but people’s voluntary behavior.
Third, the information effect has been on a downward trend since the summer of 2020. While
this trend applies to all age groups, it is relatively more pronounced among the young, so that the
age profile of the information effect remains upward sloping, suggesting that people’s response to
information about the pandemic is commensurate with their risk of serious illness and death.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the exist-
ing literature on the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Next, Section 3 presents a brief
overview of the spread of COVID-19 in Japan. Sections 4 and 5 then respectively describe the method-
ology and data used in the empirical analysis of this study, while Section 6 presents the empirical
results. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the findings and discusses their policy implications.
2 Literature Review
A large number of studies on the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic have already been
published, and the number keeps growing rapidly. Against this background, the present study is
closely related to research in the following three areas.
The first is research on the effect of lockdown policies on the extent to which people go out or remain
economically active. Studies focusing on the United States include Forsythe et al. (2020), Rojas et al.
(2020), Coibion et al. (2020), Goolsbee and Syverson (2021), Alexander and Karger (2020), and Gupta
et al. (2020). For instance, taking advantage of the fact that the lockdowns across the United States
have not occurred simultaneously but have been implemented at different times in different states
and counties, Goolsbee and Syverson (2021) compare consumer traffic in counties under lockdown
and counties not under lockdown at a particular point in time to find that the differences were not
very large. Meanwhile, Rojas et al. (2020), focusing on the fact that the timing of school closures
has varied across states, examine whether there was a difference in the number of new claims for
unemployment insurance between states with and without school closures at a given point in time.
They found no statistically significant difference. A similar result was also reported by Chetty et al.
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(2020). These studies suggest that the changes in behavior in the United States are not the result
of legally binding government measures but rather the result of people’s voluntary response to the
pandemic.
Turning to a similar study using data other than for the United States, Sheridan et al. (2020)
compare Denmark, where the government imposed legal restrictions on outings and economic activity
to prevent the spread of infections, with Sweden, where there was no such government intervention.
Finding that the decline in economic activity in the two countries was quite similar, they argue
that government intervention was not the main reason for the decline in economic activity. Chen
et al. (2020), using data for Europe, and Aum et al. (2020b), using data for Korea, reach similar
conclusions. Moreover, in our previous study (Watanabe and Yabu, 2020) using the same data as in
this study, we found that the direct effect of Japan’s emergency declaration was limited.
The second area to which our study is related is research on optimal non-pharmaceutical inter-
ventions, given that the risk of severe illness and death from COVID-19 differs substantially across
age groups. Acemoglu et al. (2020) extended the SIR model to a setting with multiple groups at
different levels of risk of serious illness and death, and quantitatively examine optimal policies in this
setting. They show that targeted lockdowns aimed at the old, who have a higher risk of severe illness
and death, are more effective in minimizing both deaths and economic losses. The reason is that in
targeted lockdowns infections can be restrained by imposing stricter lockdown policies on the old than
in uniform lockdowns, which allows a commensurate loosening of restrictions on the young, reducing
economic losses. Other analyses based on theoretical models taking the fact that the risk of serious
illness and death differs substantially across age groups into account include Baqaee et al. (2020),
Brotherhood et al. (2020), Glover et al. (2020), and Gollier (2020). The idea of shielding people ac-
cording to their risk (“stratify and shield” strategies) rather than shielding everyone uniformly has
also been proposed in the field of medicine (see, e.g., Smith and Spiegelhalter, 2020).
The third area to which our study is related is empirical research on heterogeneity in changes
in people’s behavior during the pandemic and the causes of such heterogeneity. Focusing on Italy,
Portugal, and Spain, Caselli et al. (2020) use mobile phone location data by gender and age to examine
the impact of lockdowns on people’s mobility in the three countries. They find that the mobility of
women decreased more than that of men as a result of lockdowns and that the mobility of younger
cohorts declined more than that of older cohorts. Possible reasons for the greater decline in mobility
of the young cited by Caselli et al. (2020) include that the young may be more concerned about the
health risks posed by COVID-19 than older cohorts, and that the young lost their jobs due to the
closure of restaurants and other workplaces where many young people work. Meanwhile, Andersen
et al. (2020) use bank account transaction data to examine how people’s responses to government
intervention policies differ by age. Specifically, focusing on Denmark, where strict intervention policies
were implemented, and Sweden, where no such policies were implemented, they compare spending by
age group. The results show that the spending of the youngest group fell more in Denmark, where the
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government shut down restaurants, schools, etc., in March 2020, than in Sweden, while spending of
the oldest group fell less in Denmark than in Sweden. The authors interpret their results regarding the
heterogeneity in behavior between the young and the old as suggesting that the closure of restaurants
and other facilities constrained the spending choices of individuals with low health risk (the young),
while the social distancing laws created a safer environment for those with high health risk (i.e., older
groups).
The heterogeneity in changes in behavior has also been studied using surveys. For instance, in a
survey of 1,500 Americans, Bordalo et al. (2020) found that risk perceptions with regard to COVID-
19 differed significantly across age groups. Specifically, younger age groups tended to perceive the
risks related to COVID-19 (risk of infection, risk of serious illness if infected, and risk of death if
infected) as higher than older age groups. Moreover, reflecting the differences in risk perceptions,
younger age groups changed their behavior, such as refraining from going out, to a stronger degree.
Belot et al. (2020), based on surveys conducted in six countries including the United States, Japan,
and China, show that negative non-financial effects of the crisis have been more pronounced among
younger age groups and do not differ across income groups. Using survey data on individuals living in
the United States, Papageorge et al. (2021) find that higher income was associated with higher levels
of self-protective behaviors such as hand washing, mask wearing, and social distancing. Reasons, they
suggest, include that those on higher incomes are more likely to be able to work from home and to
have transitioned to teleworking.
3 Outbreak of COVID-19 and Policy Responses in Japan
The first reported case of a COVID-19 infection in Japan – of a man who had traveled to Wuhan,
China – was on January 15, 2020. Then, on February 5, ten passengers of a cruise ship docked at
Yokohama Port were confirmed to have caught the virus. The first death in Japan was reported on
February 13. Infections in Japan began to rise in earnest from the second half of February, and as
of February 29, the cumulative number of infections had reached 242. Infections further accelerated
in early March, so that by the end of the month the cumulative number of infections had reached
2,234. In response to the spread of infections, the government on February 27 requested elementary,
junior high, and high schools nationwide to temporarily close, and on March 24 decided to postpone
the Tokyo Olympic Games scheduled for the summer of 2020. Furthermore, on April 7, a state of
emergency was declared for seven prefectures including Tokyo, and on April 16, this was expanded
to all prefectures. This was followed by the second wave in the summer of 2020, and the third wave
has been underway since November 2020. On January 7, 2021, the government declared a state of
emergency for the second time covering four prefectures including Tokyo, and on January 13, seven
more prefectures including Osaka were added to the prefectures covered.
Figure 1 shows the number of daily new infections in Tokyo, represented by the red bars. The
number of new infections increased rapidly in late March, exceeding 100 on April 4 and exceeding 200
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on April 17. With the declaration of the state of emergency, the number of new infections decreased
and fell to almost zero in mid-May. This was the first wave of the pandemic. However, the number
of new infections in Tokyo began to increase again in late June and continued to increase throughout
the summer. This was the second wave. The number of new infections in Tokyo reached a peak of 472
on August 1. In November, the number of new infections began to increase again, reaching 486 on
November 18, exceeding the peak of the second wave. The number of new infections has continued to
rise since then, and we are currently in the middle of the third wave.
The blue line in Figure 1 is the stay-at-home measure created using mobile phone location data
(details of how the measure is constructed are provided below). The line shows the extent to which
Tokyo residents refrained from leaving their home compared to January 2020, before the pandemic.
From March to May, the stay-at-home measure tended to increase as the number of new infections
rose. However, during the second wave of infections from June to August, the stay-at-home measure
hardly responded to the increase in the number of new infections. A similar lack of response can also
be observed during the start of the third wave in November. In the first wave, people refrained from
going out when they were exposed to information that the pandemic was worsening; however, after
the first wave had subsided, people became less sensitive to information about the pandemic.
4 Methodology
We estimate daily stay-at-home measures by age and gender for 47 prefectures to generate panel data.
The observation period is from January 6 to November 15. We use the panel data for the following
identification.
We start by identifying the intervention effect. Government policies such as the declaration of the
state of emergency and school closures occurred at different times across prefectures, and by using
these differences in timing, it is possible to determine whether the intervention or the information
effect was responsible for changes in people’s behavior. For example, a state of emergency was declared
in Tokyo on April 7, but at that time no state of emergency was declared for Tochigi prefecture, which
is located 100km north of Tokyo, about an hour away on the bullet train. A state of emergency was
declared in Tochigi on April 16. Therefore, there was no intervention effect in Tochigi prefecture from
April 7 to 15. However, people in Tochigi prefecture were aware that the state of emergency had been
declared in Tokyo, so there was an information effect, and the stay-at-home measure rose accordingly.
On the other hand, people in Tokyo refrained from leaving home due to both the intervention and
information effects, and the stay-at-home measure rose. Therefore, assuming that residents in Tokyo
and Tochigi had the same information about the pandemic and responded to it in the same way, we
can extract the intervention effect by observing the difference in the stay-at-home measure between
the two prefectures. It is important to note that even if the information on the pandemic is the same,
the changes in behavior resulting from fear will differ between the old and the young. Therefore,
it is crucial to measure the difference in the stay-at-home measure for the same age group in both
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prefectures, such as the old in Tokyo and the old in Tochigi Prefecture. As for the declaration of the
state of emergency, not only did the time when it was declared differ across prefectures, but the lifting
also occurred in three waves, so that differences in the timing of the lifting of the state of emergency
can also be used to identify the intervention effect. Similarly, with regard to school closures, the
timing of when school closures were lifted varies widely across prefectures, and this can also be used
to identify the intervention effect. Meanwhile, since all measures against COVID-19 are carried out
at the prefectural level, there are few differences across smaller administrative units within the same
prefecture such as municipalities.
Thus, we use the variation in the stay-at-home measure across prefectures to identify the inter-
vention effect. On the other hand, we use the variation in the stay-at-home measure across age groups
to identify the fear effect. For example, suppose that the number of new infections in Tokyo spikes on
a given day, and we want to extract the fear effect based on the change in the stay-at-home measure
for Tokyo. To simplify the explanation, let us assume that the risk of serious illness and death among
the young is zero, while it is high for the old. Because there is no risk for the young, they have no
fear. Therefore, a rapid rise in new infections will not prevent them from going out. In contrast, when
the old hear about a rise in new infections, they will be afraid and refrain from going out. Therefore,
the fear effect can be extracted by subtracting the stay-at-home measure for the young from the
stay-at-home measure for the old.
The empirical approach used in this study is as follows. Denote the stay-at-home measure at
time t for age group a in prefecture r by yart. Moreover, denote the number of new infections at
time t in prefecture r by m̃rt. The distribution of the number of new infections is skewed to the
right because the number of new infections is much larger in a small number of prefectures such as
Tokyo than most other prefectures. While many existing studies use logarithms to cope with such
highly skewed distributions, for some of the prefectures in Japan the number of new infections is
zero on some days, so that we cannot take logarithms. Following Goolsbee and Syverson (2021), we
transform m̃rt using the inverse hyperbolic sine (or arcsinh) transformation. Specifically, we define
mrt ≡ ln(m̃rt +
√
m̃2rt + 1). Similarly, we apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to the
number of deaths in each prefecture and denote this by nrt. The estimation equation used in this
study is as follows:
yart = µar + α1aDrt(Emergency declaration) + α2aDrt(School closure)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intervention effect
+β1amrt + β2anrt + γat︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fear effect
+ϵart (1)
where µar represents the effect unique to the combination of age group a and prefecture r.Drt(Emergency declaration)
is a dummy variable that takes 1 when the state of emergency is active at time t in prefecture r, and
0 otherwise. Similarly, Drt(School closure) is a dummy variable that takes 1 when schools are closed
at time t in prefecture r, and 0 otherwise. In equation (1), the coefficients of the two dummy variables
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for intervention policies, α1 and α2, are assumed to be age dependent. Highlighting that hospital-
ization and fatality rates vary substantially between age groups, Acemoglu et al. (2020) show that
targeted lockdowns focusing on the old, rather than uniform lockdowns for all age groups, would be
more desirable in terms of effectively controlling infections while minimizing the impact on economic
activity. If Japan’s intervention policies meet the criteria of optimal intervention policies proposed by
Acemoglu et al. (2020), then α1 and α2 should be increasing functions of a.
Cochrane (2020) modifies the SIR model to incorporate that people reduce contacts in response to
the severity of the disease by assuming that the transmission rate of the virus depends on the number
of new infections and deaths. Following Cochrane (2020), the fourth and fifth terms on the right-hand
side of equation (1) assume that people decide whether or not to go out in response to information
about the pandemic such as the number of new infections and deaths. The important point here is
that the two coefficients β1 and β2 in the fourth and fifth terms depend on age. This represents the
fear effect. In other words, the risk of serious illness and death increases with age, and hence the
level of fear and the sensitivity of the response to information on infections also increase with age.2
Specifically, β1a and β2a are assumed to be increasing functions of the serious illness rate θa. Next,
the sixth term on the right-hand side of equation (1) represents the response of people to information
on the pandemic other than the number of new infections and deaths. The γat in the sixth term is
the time fixed effect and takes a value specific to age group a. We assume that people respond to the
number of new infections and deaths in their own prefecture and that all other information on the
pandemic is identical across prefectures.
Equation (1) is estimated in two steps. In the first step, (1) is estimated for each age group to
obtain estimates of α1a, α2a, β1a, and β2a for each age group a. In the second step, we use the variation




k = 1, 2 (2)
Specifically, we transform β1a and θa using the arcsinh transformation and conduct a simple regression
where the former is the dependent variable and the latter is the independent variable to obtain η1.
We do the same for η2.
We would like to add the following remarks on the estimation using equation (1). First, while
we assume that, except for information on new infections and deaths, residents in all prefectures are
exposed to the same information on infections, in practice the information people have may differ
across regions. In Section 6, we divide Japan into seven regions and use a specification that allows
for different time dummies and thus a different γat for each region. Second, it is possible that the
parameter for the fear effect, βka, is not constant but may change over time. For instance, as people
experience the first, second, and third waves of the pandemic, the response to changes in the number of
2As explained earlier, the values of mrt and nrt are obtained by transforming the number of infections using the
arcsinh transformation. The coefficients on these two variables, β1a and β2a indicate that if the number of new infections
in a prefecture increases by, for example, 1%, the stay-at-home measure increases by 0.01× β1a percentage points. For
more details on the arcsinh transformation, see Bellemare and Wichman (2020).
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new infections may weaken. In Section 6, we also conduct estimations allowing for changes in βka over
time. Finally, it is possible that people’s decisions to refrain from going out differs between weekdays
and weekends/holidays. Whether or not people go out on weekdays depends on their employer’s
decision, such as whether or not they introduce remote work. In Section 6, we also estimate α and β
allowing for differences between weekdays and weekends/holidays.
5 Data
5.1 The stay-at-home measure
For our location data, we use the “Mobile Spatial Statistics” provided by DoCoMo Insight Marketing.3
The Mobile Spatial Statistics provide location records of about 78 million DoCoMo mobile phones at
10-minute intervals. Specifically, the mobile phone base stations in a particular area know which mobile
phones are in the area. Based on this information, and dividing Japan into a mesh of 500m×500m
squares, DoCoMo compiles and publishes data on how many mobile phones are in a certain mesh
element at a particular time (in 10-minute intervals), together with information on the age and
gender of the owners of those mobile phones as well as the municipality they live in. For our analysis,
we use such information on mobile phone owners’ age and divide them into seven age groups (15-19,
20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, and 70-79 years of age).
Using these data, we construct our stay-at-home measure by prefecture and age group in the
following steps. The first step consists of the detection of residential areas. For a certain mesh element,
we count the average number of people in the time from midnight to 5am and take this as the nighttime
population of that mesh element. Similarly, we count the number of people in the time from 9am to
5pm and take this as the daytime population of that mesh element. Based on this information, we
identify an area as residential if the daytime population is smaller than the nighttime population
multiplied by a parameter prespecified to be in the range from 0 to 1. We set the parameter to 0.8
but confirm that the results are essentially the same when we set the parameter to 0.7 or 0.9.
The second step is the calculation of the ratio of those leaving their homes. For mesh elements
that in the first step were identified as residential areas, we calculate the number of people leaving
home by counting the nighttime population and daytime population on a certain day and subtracting
the daytime population from the nighttime population. Next, for each prefecture, we calculate the
number of people leaving their homes each day by aggregating the number of people that have left
their homes in each mesh element.
Finally, we take the number of persons leaving their homes in January 2020 (January 6 to 31), i.e.,
before the outbreak of COVID-19, as the number of persons leaving their homes during normal times,
and then calculate for each prefecture and day the percentage difference from the number of people
leaving their homes during normal times. We use the deviation rate multiplied by −1 as the stay-at-
3For details, see https://mobaku.jp/.
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home measure. See Mizuno et al. (2021) for details of the calculation procedure for the stay-at-home
measure.
Note that our stay-at-home measure is constructed based on cellular base station data rather
than GPS data. If we were interested in how many people are in a particular commercial area, such
as stores, stations, or parks, GPS data would provide useful and reliable information, since mobile
apps requiring a GPS connection, such as Google Maps, are typically on in such commercial areas.
However, GPS data may not be that useful when users are at home and therefore do not use location
services frequently. In contrast, cellular base station data continues to provide reliable information on
users’ location even when they are at home as mobile phones stay connected to the nearest cellular
base station. Thus, cellular base station data is more suitable for our analysis, given that the focus
of this study is the extent to which people choose to stay at home in response to the outbreak of the
pandemic as well as governments’ interventions.
5.2 Number of new infections
The central government and prefectures announce the number of new infections daily. The date of
infection is the day when a doctor confirms that a person’s polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test
was positive (test result date).4 We use figures from the database constructed and published by NHK
(Nippon Hoso Kyokai, or Japan Broadcasting Corporation).5 The number of new infections varies
greatly depending on the day of the week. In the analysis here, we assume that people make their
decision on whether to leave their homes or not based on the trend in new infections over the preceding
week, and we therefore use the moving average over the preceding week including the day in question.
5.3 Number of deaths
We use the data published by the government and local governments and aggregated by prefecture
by NHK. The number of deaths in Japan is low compared to the United States, Europe, and other
countries (as of January 31, 2021, the total number of deaths in Japan was 5,753). For this reason,
92% of all cells in the daily data by prefecture are zero. For the number of deaths, we use the moving
average over the preceding week including the day in question, since it is likely that people make
decisions on whether to go out or not by paying attention to trends rather than to daily figures. The
number of cells containing zero when we use the seven-day moving average is 79% of the total.
4There are two possible ways to define the date of infection: the date a person actually contracted the virus, and
the date infection with the virus is confirmed. However, since the infected person may not necessarily know for certain
when and where they contracted the virus, the date of infection is often impossible to determine. On the other hand,
the date of a test result is clearly recorded. Since the number of infections reported in newspapers and on TV is based
on the date of the test result, it is likely that people’s decision-making on whether to leave their home is affected by
the number of infections based on the date of the test result.
5See https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/special/coronavirus/data/. Persons for which the prefecture of residence is
unknown or who reside abroad are excluded from the sample.
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5.4 Serious illness rate and fatality rate
The severe illness rate is the sum of the number of severe cases and deaths divided by the number
of infected persons, including asymptomatic cases. The fatality rate is the number of deaths divided
by the number of infected persons, including asymptomatic cases. The original data are surveillance
data gathered by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. Both the severe illness rate and the
fatality rate are based on confirmed cases from January to April 2020 and on confirmed cases from
June to August 2020. The age groups are: under 10 years of age, 10-19, 20-29, · · · , 80-89 years of age,
and 90 years and older. See MHLW (2020) for details.
5.5 Government measures against the spread of COVID-19
School closures On February 27, the government requested all elementary schools, junior high
schools, high schools, and special needs schools to be closed from March 2 onwards. In response to
this, all prefectures except Hokkaido closed schools from March 2.6 We construct a dummy variable
for school closures, School closure, that takes 1 during the period schools were closed in a particular
prefecture, and 0 otherwise. Specifically, except for Hokkaido, the dummy takes 1 from March 2,
the day that schools were closed, until the date on which schools were opened again in a particular
prefecture. For Hokkaido, the dummy takes a value of 1 from February 27, the day on which schools
were closed in that prefecture. The date of the reopening of schools varies widely across prefectures:
the earliest date was April 6, while the latest date was June 1. Note that if a prefecture closed schools
again within a short time of reopening them, we do not regard this as reopening.
State of emergency The government declared a state of emergency for seven prefectures (Saitama,
Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Osaka, Hyogo, Fukuoka) on April 7, and expanded the state of emergency
to all prefectures on April 16.7 The state of emergency was lifted in 39 prefectures with few infections
on May 14, in three more prefectures on May 21, and finally in the remaining five prefectures including
Tokyo on May 25. We also construct a dummy variable for the state of emergency, State of Emergency,
that takes 1 when the state of emergency is active in a particular prefecture, and 0 otherwise. For
example, for Tokyo, the State of Emergency dummy is set to 1 from April 8, the day after a state of
emergency was declared for Tokyo, to May 25, when it was lifted.
5.6 Other factors affecting whether people left their homes
To take other factors into account, a rain dummy (Rain) is used. The rain dummy takes 1 if the amount
of precipitation in the prefectural capital was greater than 0, and takes 0 otherwise. Precipitation data
were obtained from the Japan Meteorological Agency website.
6For details, see https://www.mext.go.jp/content/20200304-mxt_kouhou02-000004520_1.pdf (in Japanese).





Let us begin by examining how the results we obtained in our earlier study (Watanabe and Yabu,
2020) change when we extend the estimation period. Specification (1) in Table 1 is exactly the same as
that used in Watanabe and Yabu (2020), and the main explanatory variables are the dummy variables
for the two intervention policies, i.e., the state of emergency declaration and closure of schools, and
the number of new infections to capture the information effect. As fixed effects, we include prefecture
dummies and time dummies for each of the seven regions. To take into account that the number of
mobile phone owners differs across prefectures, the estimation is conducted employing weighted least
squares using the number of mobile phone owners as weights.
The results for specification (1) show that the coefficient on the school closure dummy is 6.5,
indicating that school closures had the effect of raising the stay-at-home measure by 6.5 percentage
points. Meanwhile, the state of emergency declaration had the effect of raising the stay-at-home
measure by 9.6 percentage points. The corresponding coefficient estimates in Watanabe and Yabu
(2020) using data for the first wave only were 4.8 and 7.0, respectively. Thus, both coefficients in our
new estimate are slightly larger than in the previous estimate. Next, the coefficient for the number of
new infections is 0.8, meaning that a 1% increase in the number of new infections in a prefecture raised
the stay-at-home measure for that prefecture by 0.008 percentage points. This is considerably smaller
than the coefficient estimate of 2.2 obtained in Watanabe and Yabu (2020). This result confirms the
observation from Figure 1 that since June 2020 the stay-at-home measure has become less responsive
to changes in the number of new infections.
Many studies on the United States, Europe, China, and other countries use the number of deaths
as the variable to represent the spread of infections. The reason is that the number of new infections is
regarded to represent an inaccurate picture of the true situation since it is affected by changes in the
number of tests. Therefore, in specification (2) we use the number of deaths instead of the number of
new infections to represent the information effect. The coefficient on the number of deaths is 2.3 and
is statistically significant, indicating that a 1% increase in the number of deaths in a given prefecture
is associated with a 0.023 percentage point increase in the stay-at-home measure of that prefecture.
Further, in specification (3), we include both the number of new infections and the number of deaths
in the estimation and find that the coefficients for both are statistically significant. The number of
deaths, although small, had a non-negligible impact on the stay-at-home measure.
Next, in specifications (3) and (4) we use the interaction term of the number of new infections and
time dummies and the interaction term of the number of deaths and time dummies as explanatory
variables to examine how the coefficients on the number of new infections and deaths changed over
time. Figure 2 shows the coefficient estimates. The coefficient for the number of new infections began
to rise at the end of March and reached a value of 3 in April during the state of emergency. It began to
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decline when the state of emergency was lifted and continued to decline until it reached almost zero in
September, where it subsequently more or less remained.8 This shows that the pattern seen in Figure
1 for Tokyo, where despite the increase in the number of new infections during the second and third
waves, the stay-at-home measure did not increase, can also be observed for Japan as a whole. Next,
turning to the coefficient for the number of deaths, this shows a large jump at the beginning of March,
but since then it has remained around 2. However, in autumn, like the coefficient for the number of
new infections, it dropped to almost zero. A possible reason for the decline in the coefficients for the
number of new infections and deaths may be that the fear of infection has been decreasing. This point
will be examined in more detail in Section 6.4.
Figure 3 shows the results of decomposing changes in the stay-at-home measure for Tokyo into
the intervention effect and the information effect using the estimation results of specification (4).
The intervention effect shows how much the two intervention policies, i.e., school closures and the
emergency declaration, contributed to the increase in the stay-at-home measure. The information
effect shows how much information on the number of new infections and deaths contributed to the
increase in the stay-at-home measure by prompting people to refrain from going out. Moreover, the
response of people to other information about the pandemic can be considered to be captured by
the time fixed effect, and we include this in the information effect. As can be seen from the figure,
the contribution of the two interventions is limited. On the other hand, the contribution of the
information effect is large. This is identical to the result in our previous study (Watanabe and Yabu,
2020). However, here we find that the contribution of the information effect became smaller from
the second half of September. Particularly noteworthy is that the contribution of the information
effect linked to the number of new infections has become quite small. Meanwhile, the number of
new infections itself has not decreased in Tokyo since the latter half of September – in fact, it has
increased. On the other hand, as seen in Figure 2, people’s response to the change in the number of
new infections has weakened, and as a result, the contribution of the information effect through the
number of new infections has decreased.
6.2 Intervention effect by gender, age, and weekday/weekend
Next, we examine the intervention effect by gender, age, and weekday/weekend. In Tables 2 and 3,
we use specification (3) from Table 1 to conduct estimates by gender and age. Table 2 shows the
results of the same estimation using only weekday data, while Table 3 shows the results using only
weekend/public holiday data. With a few exceptions, all the estimated coefficients are statistically
significant.
Based on the results in Tables 2 and 3, Figure 4 looks at how the intervention effect depends on
8The coefficient on the number of new infections fell substantially in mid-August. This was likely due to the fact that
residents in urban areas with relatively high infection numbers went out during the Obon holidays. The coefficient on
the number of new infections also fell around March 20, which may be due to an increase in outings for cherry blossom
viewing.
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gender and age. Starting with the impact of school closures on the stay-at-home measure for weekdays,
we find that school closures had a large intervention effect for 15-19 year olds (i.e., those of school
age), while the intervention effect for the other age groups, although not zero, was small. In terms
of gender, restraint from going out was slightly larger among women, suggesting that the burden
of housework and childcare during school closures may have disproportionately fallen on women.
Further, what is interesting about the estimation results for the intervention effect of school closures
is that a statistically significant intervention effect is observed even for weekends and public holidays.
This suggests that the school closures may have reduced interaction between students and parents at
school, leading to a reduction in weekend activities.
Turning to the intervention effect of the state of emergency declaration, the results show that this
is dependent on age: with the exception of the 15-19 age group, the intervention effects get weaker
with age. The difference between younger and older age groups is particularly pronounced for women
on weekends/holidays and is statistically significant when comparing women in their 20s with those in
their 60s and 70s. Thus, while Acemoglu et al. (2020) argue that optimal intervention policies would
impose restrictions on those most at risk, namely, older age groups, Japan’s emergency declaration had
the opposite effect in that the extent to which people refrained from going out was more pronounced
among the young.
When declaring the state of emergency, the Japanese government and local governments such as
the Tokyo Metropolitan Government asked households to reduce their contacts with others by 80%
by refraining from going out, while employers were asked to reduce the number of people coming in
to work by 40% by introducing remote work. Further, theaters, meeting facilities, and entertainment
establishments (nightclubs, live music venues, karaoke boxes, etc.) were requested to close, while
restaurants were asked to refrain from operating after 8pm. The request to employers to curtail the
number of workers required to come in to work had the effect of reducing outings by those of working-
age, while the request for places such as entertainment establishments and restaurants to close or
refrain from operating after 8pm had the effect of discouraging those in their 20s to 50s – the main
users of such places – from going out. Although the government did not intend to reduce outings of
older age groups at higher risk of illness and death to a lesser extent than that of younger age groups,
this ultimately was the effect of the state of emergency. This may have unnecessarily increased the
number of people falling seriously ill, putting medical resources under strain and increasing the number
of deaths. However, our finding that government intervention inadvertently may have had the opposite
of the intended effect is not unique to Japan: as mentioned in Section 2, studies by Caselli et al. (2020)
and Andersen et al. (2020), among others, using data for Europe, also show that government policies
in these countries have restricted activities of the young to a greater extent than those of the old,
suggesting that government intervention policies to prevent infections did not meet the criteria of
optimal intervention policies proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2020).
Comparing the intervention effect of the emergency declaration between men and women of the
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same age group, we find that in all age groups women refrained from going out to a greater degree
than men, both on weekdays and on weekends/holidays. This result is similar to the effect of school
closures mentioned earlier. One possible explanation is that, as shown by Kikuchi et al. (2021) using
data for Japan, women are more likely to be employed in contact-intensive sectors. Similarly, Caselli
et al. (2020) found that in Italy, Spain, and Portugal, the decline in mobility during lockdowns was
larger for women than for men. They suggest that this was because the burden of housework and
looking after children during the lockdowns disproportionately fell on women, and because women are
more likely to be employed in contact-intensive sectors and are therefore affected to a greater degree
by the impact of lockdowns on employment. The results thus show that in major countries including
Japan, government intervention policies have forced women to stay at home to a greater extent than
men.
6.3 Information effect by gender, age, and weekday/weekend
We now turn to the information - or fear - effect. Specifically, in Figure 5, we compare the information
effect by age, gender, and weekday/weekend using the results from Tables 2 and 3. The upper panel
shows the coefficients for the number of new infections, while the lower panel shows the coefficients
for the number of deaths. Starting with the coefficients for the number of new infections for women,
we find that for weekends/holidays the coefficient tends to increase with age from those in their
20s. For example, the coefficients for women in their 20s (0.3), 60s (0.8), and 70s (1.2) are very
different, and some of these differences are statistically significant. This finding suggests that the
older the age group, the greater is the fear of infection in response to news about an increase in the
number of new infections, and the greater is the restraint from going out. On the other hand, for
weekdays, the coefficient tends to slightly decrease with age from those in their 20s to those in their
50s and 60s. However, the coefficient for those in their 70s then increases substantially from those
in their 50s and 60s. The pattern that the coefficient increases with age for weekends/holidays but,
conversely, decreases with age for weekdays is also observed for men. The reason why the way that
the information effect depends on age differs between weekdays and weekends/holidays likely is that
whereas on weekends and holidays it is individuals themselves who decide whether to stay at home
in response to news about the pandemic, on weekdays this is largely up to employers. That is, those
in their 20s to 50s tend to be active workers, and how they respond to an increase in the number of
new infections largely depends on the decision of employers, such as whether they introduce remote
working. On the other hand, older individuals that are already retired can decide for themselves how
to respond to changes in the number of new infections.9
Next, looking at the coefficients on the number of deaths, both for men and women, the values
for weekends/holidays are more or less identical across age groups for those in their 20s and upward.
9The pattern for minors – i.e., those aged 15-19 – differs from that for those in their 20s, and the coefficient for this
age group is larger than that for the other age groups even on weekends and public holidays. This suggests that parents,
schools, and cram schools play a substantial part in minors’ decision-making about whether to go out or not
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Thus, we do not find the same pattern as for the coefficient on the number of new infections, which
increases with age. For weekdays, the coefficient tends to decrease with age for those in their 20s and
upward. Cochrane (2020) argues that although the number of new infections and the number of deaths
both provide information about the pandemic, the meaning for recipients differs substantially. If this
is indeed the case, this implies that information about an increase in the number of new infections in
a particular prefecture on a given day means that the risk of infection in that prefecture at that time
has increased, and people react to that information by refraining from going out. In making their
decisions, people will also take into account that the risk of serious illness and death varies with age.
In contrast, news of an increase in the number of deaths is merely the result of an increase in the
number of infections in the past and does not necessarily mean that the risk of infection on that day
is particularly high. Of course, news of an increase in the number of deaths likely raises people’s fear
and discourages them from going out. In fact, the coefficient on the number of deaths is positive for
all age groups and statistically significant, except for the 15-19 age group. However, since this type of
fear does not stem from the increased risk of infection on that day, it is not necessarily the case that
older people, who are at higher risk of severe illness and death, are more afraid. The finding that the
coefficient for weekends/holidays is almost identical across age groups can be interpreted as reflecting
these circumstances.
Figure 6 shows how the coefficient on the number of new infections for each age group is related
to the serious illness rate. The panel on the left is for women, while that on the right is for men,
and, using the estimate for weekends/holidays for each age group from those in their 20s to those in
their 70s, we look at the relationship between the coefficient on the number of new infections and
the corresponding severe illness rate. As we saw in Figure 5, whether people leave home on weekdays
largely reflects the decisions of employers, so that we use the results for weekends/holidays here.
Moreover, we exclude the age group of 15-19 year olds because whether they go out primarily reflects
their parents’ decision. The severe illness rate is estimated based on the values for the period from
June to August 2020. The severe illness rate on the horizontal axis is shown in logarithmic scale. Both
for women and men, a positive correlation between the logarithm of the severe illness rate and the
coefficient on the number of new infections can be observed. Running a simple regression, we find
that a ten-fold increase in the severe illness rate is associated with an increase in the coefficient on
the number of new infections of 0.25 for women and 0.20 for men. We will examine this in more detail
in the next subsection.
6.4 Changes in the information effect over time
As seen in Figure 2, the coefficients on the number of new infections and deaths change substantially
over time, indicating that the information effect is not constant over time. In this subsection, we
therefore examine the coefficients on the number of new infections by gender and age allowing for
changes in the coefficient over time. Specifically, we estimate equation (1) regarding β1 as a time-
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varying parameter. However, we continue to estimate the coefficient on the number of deaths, β2,
as a fixed parameter because the prefecture-level number of deaths is zero on many days. The esti-
mates of β1 obtained in this manner are shown in Appendix Figures A1 (for weekdays) and A2 (for
weekends/holidays).
Using these estimates, Figure 7 shows the differences in the coefficients on the number of new
infections between different age groups. Specifically, the three lines represent the difference between
the coefficients for people in their 70s and those in their 20s, the difference between the coefficients
for people in their 60s and those in their 20s, and the difference between the coefficients for people
in their 50s and those in their 20s. The upper panels show the results for weekdays, while the lower
panels show the results for weekends/holidays.
The figure suggests the following. First, in the period from the end of February to the beginning
of April, before the declaration of the state of emergency, the difference between those in their 70s
and those in their 20s was large and positive. Similarly, the difference between those in their 60s and
20s was also positive. This pattern can be observed for both weekdays and weekends/holidays and for
both women and men. On the other hand, while the difference between those in their 50s and those
in their 20s was positive on weekends/holidays, it was zero or slightly negative on weekdays. The fact
that the coefficients for the older age groups were higher than for those in their 20s suggests that
people’s response to information about the pandemic reflected their level of risk of serious illness and
death.
Second, looking at the period of the state of emergency from April to May, the difference between
the older age groups and those in their 20s turned negative. Taking a closer look at Figures A1 and A2
shows why this sign reversal occurs: the coefficient for those in their 70s during the state of emergency
fell from the level before the state of emergency. Moreover, while the coefficients for those in their 60s
and 50s increased slightly compared to before the state of emergency, the increase was negligible. In
contrast, the coefficients for people in their 20s increased markedly with the declaration of the state
of emergency. A possible reason for the difference between the older age groups and those in their 20s
is that those in their 20s may have been less aware of the pandemic at first, but this changed as the
state of emergency was declared.10
Third, after the state of emergency was lifted in June, the difference between the older age groups
and those in their 20s was negative or zero on weekdays as before the state of emergency, but it
returned to a positive level for weekends/holidays. The fact that the difference returned to a positive
level on weekends/holidays, when employers hold little sway over the decision whether people leave
home, suggests that people’s response to information about the pandemic was commensurate with
their risk of serious illness and death. Note that the estimates for each age group on weekends/holidays
10In this context, it is worth noting that Bordalo et al. (2020), based on a survey of 1,500 Americans, suggest that
for the young the current COVID-19 crisis represents a “disease and death” shock that was particularly surprising and
that the young tended to have a higher assessment of the risks associated with the pandemic (risk of infection, risk of
serious illness if infected, and risk of death if infected). Applied to Japan, this finding suggests that the risk perceptions
of the young may have changed substantially as a result of the declaration of a state of emergency.
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shown in Figure A2 indicate that the coefficients for all age groups declined gradually after the state of
emergency, before starting to slightly pick up again early October. During this process, the coefficients
for the older age groups showed first a slower decline and then a quicker increase.
Next, Figure 8 shows the results of estimating η1 in equation (2) in order to examine the relation-
ship between the coefficient on the number of new infections and the risk of severe illness. Specifically,
we take the arcsinh transform of the estimated number of new infections by gender and age as the
dependent variable and regress this on the interaction term of the arcsinh transform of the severe
illness rate by age and week dummies as well as a dummy for women and the week dummies. For the
severe illness rate, we use the values for January-April and June-August 2020 as estimated by MHLW
(2020). The red line in the figure depicts the coefficient on the severe illness rate multiplied by the
week dummy and is an estimate of η1. The blue line shows the coefficient on the week dummy. The
error bars for each estimate represent the range of the estimate ±1.645 times the robust standard
error.
As shown in Figure 2, the coefficient on the number of new infections has been declining since June.
If this downward trend is due to the weakening of the fear effect in equation (1), then η1 (i.e., the red
line in Figure 8) should decrease over time and approach zero. However, looking at developments in
η1 after the state of emergency, we find that for weekdays, as shown in Figure 8(a), it stayed negative
from June to September and then rose to close to zero in October. On the other hand, Figure 8(b) for
weekends/holidays indicates that the value was zero at the beginning of June but has been positive
since then and for quite a few weeks is statistically significantly different from zero. These results
(especially those for weekends/holidays) mean that the interpretation that η1 – and hence the fear
effect – decreased after the state of emergency was lifted, and that this is the reason why the coefficient
on the number of new infections decreased, is not appropriate.
On the other hand, looking at developments in the constant term represented by the blue line,
we find that it increased around the time the state of emergency was declared and then gradually
decreased once the state of emergency was lifted. Moreover, this pattern can be observed for both
weekdays and weekends/holidays. A potential reason for this may be that factors other than fear,
such as altruism, that initially led to changes in behavior may have gradually weakened during this
period.11 Another possibility is that people’s perception of the severe illness rate deviated from the
actual severe illness rate as estimated by MHLW (2020). Specifically, a possible explanation of the
change in the constant term would be that the perceived severe illness rate for each age group uniformly
increased with the declaration of the state of emergency and then uniformly decreased with the lifting
of the state of emergency. Note that the estimates of η1 in Figure 8 are negative during the state
11Alfaro et al. (2020) cite fear and altruism as reasons for changes in people’s behavior. The former is the fear of
becoming infected, while the latter is the concern that being infected oneself may endanger those around one. For
instance, people wear masks to protect themselves as well as others (see Cheng et al., 2020). Fear is thought to be
stronger in the old, who are at a higher risk of serious illness and death. In contrast, there are no a priori reasons to
believe that there is a large difference in altruism across age groups. Therefore, if changes in behavior originate from
altruism, changes in people’s behavior when they are exposed to information about the pandemic should be unrelated
to age.
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of emergency. This also suggests that the value of θ used in the regression in this paper may have
deviated from the perceived severe illness rate during this period.
7 Summary and Policy Implications
In this study, we examined how people’s behavior changed during the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of
refraining from going out. As channels of such changes in behavior, we focused on the intervention effect
(changes in people’s behavior as a result of government orders or requests) and the information effect
(voluntary changes in behavior in response to information about the pandemic). Using smartphone
location data, we created a stay-at-home measure by age group and gender to examine how the
intervention and information effects depend on age.
The main findings of this study are as follows. First, the age profile of the intervention effect of the
emergency declarations issued in April and May 2020 shows that the degree to which older age groups
with a higher risk of serious illness and death refrained from leaving home was smaller than that
for younger age groups. This result indicates that the emergency declaration had the exact opposite
effect of the targeted lockdowns proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2020), which aim to quarantine the old
while allowing the young to carry on with economic activities, and may not have had the intended
impact in terms of effectively minimizing both the public health consequences and economic losses.
Underlying this, changes on the supply side of face-to-face services may have played an important
role. That is, in the prefectures covered by the state of emergency, commercial facilities in shopping
areas such as restaurants, theaters, and retail stores were requested to shorten their business hours
or close, but the main users of such commercial facilities in shopping areas are those in their 20s to
50s. Thus, compared with those in the same age group in prefectures not affected by the state of
emergency, those in the affected prefectures had fewer opportunities to use such commercial facilities
and for this reason likely reduced their outings. In contrast, older age groups in their 60s and above
were less likely to use such commercial facilities in the first place and thus were less affected by the
supply-side effects of the emergency declaration.
Second, the age profile of the information effect shows that, unlike the intervention effect, the
degree to which people stayed at home tended to increase with age for weekends and public holidays.
This result suggests that people update their information about the pandemic daily and make decisions
to refrain from going out based on their own risk of serious illness and death. In other words, what
achieved a “targeted lockdown” à la Acemoglu et al. (2020) was not government interventions such
as the declaration of a state of emergency but voluntary changes in people’s behavior. However,
for weekdays, we observe no tendency for the degree to which people stayed at home to increase
with age. On weekends and public holidays, people make decisions about whether or not to go out
as consumers, and differences in the risk of serious illness and death across age groups tend to be
reflected in differences in refraining from going out. On the other hand, on weekdays, people are both
consumers and workers, and their decision whether or not to go out as workers depends largely on
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the decision of their employer (e.g., to shorten working hours or introduce working from home). This
likely explains why the link between age and the degree to which people stay at home is relatively
weak for weekdays.
Third, the information effect has been on a downward trend since the summer of 2020. While
this trend applies to all age groups, it is relatively more pronounced among the young, so that the
age profile of the information effect remains upward sloping, suggesting that people’s response to
information about the pandemic is commensurate with their risk of serious illness and death.
Next, let us consider the policy implications of our findings. The state of emergency in April-May
2020 included measures to curb the activities of contact-intensive service industries, such as closing
or reducing the opening hours of commercial facilities in shopping areas. Similar measures have been
taken in the second state of emergency declared on January 7, 2021, which at the time of writing
is still in effect in Tokyo and other prefectures. Our results suggest these supply-side measures have
the effect of reducing activities of younger age groups to a greater extent than older age groups. This
means that while their negative impact on economic activity is substantial, their effectiveness in terms
of reining in the pandemic is limited. In fact, both during last year’s state of emergency and during
the current state of emergency, the number of seriously ill elderly COVID patients increased rapidly,
resulting in a severe shortage of hospital beds and medical resources. While the analysis in this study
has focused only on the first state of emergency, it is important to examine whether the same age
profile in terms of the effect – i.e., that it reduced outings by the young to a greater extent than the
old – can be observed again for the second state of emergency. Moreover, based on the experience
gained from the first and second state of emergency, a key point that warrants discussion is how the
current type of government interventions could or should be modified to achieve optimal results in
terms of effectively controlling infections while minimizing the adverse impact on economic activity.
Another issue is whether the government’s measures against the pandemic should be legally bind-
ing. Japan’s historical experience with government measures to control epidemics and other emergency
measures means that the government has been reluctant to introduce legally binding measures.12 How-
ever, on February 3, 2021, Japan’s parliament passed a bill to impose a fine, i.e., an administrative
punishment, on restaurants and other establishments that fail to comply with requests to shorten their
opening hours and on COVID-19 patients that refuse to be hospitalized. However, as highlighted in
numerous studies (e.g., Goolsbee and Syverson, 2021), the direct effects of legally binding interven-
tion policies in the United States and Europe have been limited. Examining whether the decision to
strengthen legally binding interventions is appropriate therefore is an important issue for the future.
Finally, we would like to mention an issue that we were unable to fully explore in this study.
That is, while we focused on people’s fear as one of the reasons for changes in behavior, another
possible reason, as highlighted by Alfaro et al. (2020) and others, is altruism. According to estimates
by Bethune and Korinek (2020), due to infection externalities the cost of infection to an individual is
12See, e.g., Kushner (2020) for details.
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only one-third of the cost to society. In other words, avoiding getting infected generates three times
the benefit to society as a whole. To achieve this benefit, altruism is indispensable. A key research
question for the future therefore concerns the role of altruism during the current and future pandemics,
such as the extent to which changes in behavior during the current pandemic were caused by altruism
and how changes in behavior due to altruism are linked people’s values and beliefs in normal times.
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Table 1: Baseline Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
School closure 6.454*** 6.021*** 6.111*** 5.054***
(1.031) (0.988) (1.023) (1.192)
State of emergency 9.602*** 9.067*** 8.983*** 5.363***
(1.152) (0.979) (0.970) (1.208)
No. of new infections 0.810** 0.496** Time-varying
(0.306) (0.223)
No. of deaths 2.326*** 1.923*** Time-varying
(0.721) (0.634)
Rain 0.661*** 0.709*** 0.690*** 0.688***
(0.199) (0.200) (0.198) (0.209)
Obs. 14805 14805 14805 14805
Adjusted R2 0.957 0.958 0.958 0.974
FEs Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture
Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region
Notes: Figures in parentheses are cluster-robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. For the number of
new infections within prefectures, the inverse hyperbolic sine transforms (arcsinh(x) =
ln(x+
√
x2 + 1)) were used. Similarly, the number of deaths were transformed using the
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. The coefficients for the number of new infections
and the number of deaths are shown in Figure 2.
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Table 2: Intervention and Information Effects by Gender and Age: Week-
days
Men 15-19 y/o 20-29 y/o 30-39 y/o 40-49 y/o 50-59 y/o 60-69 y/o 70-79 y/o
School closure 23.797*** 4.500*** 2.619*** 5.282*** 4.650*** 3.112*** 4.317***
(4.287) (1.242) (1.062) (1.073) (1.012) (0.817) (1.065)
State of emergency 9.947*** 10.313*** 8.359*** 6.472*** 7.719*** 7.556*** 6.928***
(2.104) (1.568) (1.198) (0.836) (1.067) (1.005) (0.917)
No. of new infections 0.996*** 1.000*** 0.947*** 1.028*** 0.692*** 0.380*** 0.608***
(0.387) (0.271) (0.337) (0.307) (0.260) (0.188) (0.144)
No. of deaths 0.873 2.965*** 2.928*** 2.193*** 2.021*** 1.847*** 1.377***
(0.681) (0.920) (0.866) (0.657) (0.598) (0.553) (0.425)
Rain 0.289 0.351* 0.403*** 0.477*** 0.531*** 0.960*** 2.251***
(0.359) (0.192) (0.145) (0.151) (0.167) (0.229) (0.450)
Obs. 9917 9917 9917 9917 9917 9917 9917
Adjusted R2 0.951 0.934 0.925 0.937 0.943 0.933 0.932
FEs Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture
Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region
Women 15-19 y/o 20-29 y/o 30-39 y/o 40-49 y/o 50-59 y/o 60-69 y/o 70-79 y/o
School closure 26.453*** 5.199*** 5.354*** 7.575*** 4.473*** 4.233*** 5.390***
(4.506) (1.304) (1.277) (1.452) (1.128) (0.942) (1.205)
State of emergency 9.782*** 12.230*** 10.491*** 8.866*** 9.601*** 8.884*** 8.352***
(2.027) (1.523) (1.293) (0.930) (1.218) (1.020) (0.959)
No. of new infections 1.466*** 0.912*** 0.891*** 1.064*** 0.676*** 0.655*** 1.039***
(0.398) (0.233) (0.296) (0.310) (0.218) (0.132) (0.148)
No. of deaths 0.598 2.563*** 2.674*** 2.270*** 2.363*** 1.837*** 1.395***
(0.528) (0.833) (0.749) (0.636) (0.676) (0.577) (0.426)
Rain 0.240 0.375* 0.535*** 0.433*** 0.571*** 1.080*** 2.060***
(0.369) (0.198) (0.179) (0.177) (0.184) (0.251) (0.411)
Obs. 9917 9917 9917 9917 9917 9917 9917
Adjusted R2 0.955 0.949 0.946 0.951 0.950 0.946 0.951
FEs Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture
Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region
Notes: Figures in parentheses are cluster-robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. For the number of new infections within prefectures, the inverse
hyperbolic sine transforms (arcsinh(x) = ln(x +
√
x2 + 1)) were used. Similarly, the number of deaths were
transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
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Table 3: Intervention and Information Effects by Gender and Age: Week-
ends/Holidays
Men 15-19 y/o 20-29 y/o 30-39 y/o 40-49 y/o 50-59 y/o 60-69 y/o 70-79 y/o
School closure 15.946*** 4.908*** 3.639*** 5.474*** 4.994*** 4.988*** 6.195***
(2.958) (1.189) (1.005) (1.251) (1.147) (1.288) (1.710)
State of emergency 8.952*** 10.109*** 8.351*** 7.904*** 9.294*** 8.902*** 7.810***
(1.262) (0.881) (0.771) (0.758) (1.016) (0.892) (0.861)
No. of new infections 1.020*** 0.255 0.221 0.475*** 0.229 0.371* 0.969***
(0.267) (0.245) (0.200) (0.157) (0.192) (0.206) (0.190)
No. of deaths 0.671 2.075*** 1.924*** 1.625*** 1.867*** 2.113*** 2.026***
(0.618) (0.717) (0.577) (0.620) (0.672) (0.610) (0.547)
Rain 1.792*** 1.473*** 1.648*** 1.659*** 1.797*** 2.053*** 3.438***
(0.523) (0.418) (0.359) (0.371) (0.423) (0.500) (0.763)
Obs. 4888 4888 4888 4888 4888 4888 4888
Adjusted R2 0.947 0.927 0.938 0.957 0.953 0.951 0.950
FEs Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture
Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region
Women 15-19 y/o 20-29 y/o 30-39 y/o 40-49 y/o 50-59 y/o 60-69 y/o 70-79 y/o
School closure 13.816*** 5.645*** 6.113*** 7.350*** 5.962*** 6.244*** 7.026***
(2.244) (1.172) (1.273) (1.376) (1.146) (1.316) (1.764)
State of emergency 10.776*** 15.138*** 11.444*** 10.405*** 10.972*** 9.372*** 8.394***
(0.882) (1.227) (1.063) (0.998) (1.200) (1.012) (0.885)
No. of new infections 1.274*** 0.297 0.689*** 0.754*** 0.627*** 0.820*** 1.181***
(0.282) (0.241) (0.223) (0.207) (0.225) (0.206) (0.209)
No. of deaths 0.699 2.474*** 1.915*** 1.891*** 2.195*** 2.124*** 1.770***
(0.525) (0.762) (0.623) (0.637) (0.704) (0.606) (0.477)
Rain 0.954** 0.862** 1.590*** 1.425*** 1.267*** 1.752*** 2.880***
(0.418) (0.325) (0.363) (0.347) (0.359) (0.443) (0.648)
Obs. 4888 4888 4888 4888 4888 4888 4888
Adjusted R2 0.959 0.957 0.965 0.969 0.962 0.962 0.962
FEs Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture
Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region Day×Region
Notes: Figures in parentheses are cluster-robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. For the number of new infections within prefectures, the inverse
hyperbolic sine transforms (arcsinh(x) = ln(x +
√
x2 + 1)) were used. Similarly, the number of deaths were
transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
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Figure 2: Responsiveness of Stay-at-Home Measure to Number of New


































































































Note: The figure shows the coefficients for the number of new infections and the
number of deaths obtained using specification (4) in Table 1. The lines depict
the centered 11-day moving averages of the coefficient estimates. The figure
only shows the period from February 22, 2020, onward, when the cumulative
number of infections surpassed 100. The shaded area represents the period of
the state of emergency (April 7 to May 25, 2020).
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Notes: Changes in the stay-at-home measure for Tokyo are decomposed into the
intervention and the information effects using the estimation results from specifica-
tion (4) in Table 1. To eliminate seasonal fluctuations, only weekday observations
are used for the stay-at-home measure.
32







































































































































Note: The figures show the coefficient estimates presented in Tables 2 and 3.
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Figure 5: Information Effect by Gender, Age, and Weekday/Weekend
























































































































Note: The figures show the coefficient estimates presented in Tables 2 and 3.
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Figure 6: Serious Illness Rate, Infection Fatality Rate, and Information
Effect










































































































































































Note: The serious illness and infection fatality rates are the values for January to April 2020 taken
from MHLW (2020). The coefficients for the number of new infections are taken from Tables 2 and 3.
The vertical lines represent the error bar for each estimate, i.e., the estimated coefficient±standard
error.
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Note: The shaded area represents the period of the state of emergency (April
7 to May 25, 2020).
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Notes: The dependent variable is the arcsinh transform of the coefficient on the number of new infections by
gender and age. Independent variables are the interaction terms of the arcsinh transform of the severe illness
rate and the week dummies as well as a dummy for women and the week dummies. The red line represents
the coefficient for the interaction terms of the age-specific severe illness rate and the week dummies, while
the blue line shows the coefficient for the week dummies. The error bars for each week represent the range
of the estimate±1.645×robust standard error. For the severe illness rate, the values from MHLW (2020) for
January-April and June-August 2020 are used. For May 2020, the average of the values for January-April
and June-August 2020 is used, while for the period from September onward, the value for June-August 2020
is used. The shaded area represents the period of the state of emergency (April 7 to May 25, 2020).
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Notes: Estimated based on eq. (1) with the coefficient on the number of new infections, β1,
regarded as time varying while the coefficient on the number of deaths, β2, as time invariant.
The rain dummy is used. Only weekday observations are used. The shaded area represents
the period of the state of emergency (April 7 to May 25, 2020).
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Notes: Estimated based on equation (1) with the coefficient on the number of new infections,
β1, regarded as time-varying, while the coefficient on the number of deaths, β2, is regarded as
time-invariant. The rain dummy is used. Only weekend/holiday observations are used. The
shaded area represents the period of the state of emergency (April 7 to May 25, 2020).
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